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LABOR LAW
Peer review: 'I'll give you my opinion
if you don't tell anyone what it is'
by BarbaraJ. Fick
University of Pennsylvania
V.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(Docket No. 88-493)
Argument Date: Nov. 7, 1989
ISSUE
In the course of investigating a complaint that the
University of Pennsylvania engaged in racial, sexual and
national origin discrimination when it denied tenure to one
of its associate professors, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission issued a subpoena for the peer review
documents the university used in arriving at its tenure
decision.
Now the Supreme Court is being asked to decide
whether the university must comply with that subpoena.
FACTS
After Rosalie ung, an associate professor in the Manage-
ment Department of the Wharton school, University of
Pennsylvania, was denied tenure, she filed a charge with
the EEOC alleging that the denial was the result of race,
sex and national origin discrimination.
In support of her charge, she claimed that she had been
sexually harassed by the department chair and that he had
submitted an unfavorable evaluation because of her nega-
tive response to that harassment. She also claimed that her
qualifications equalled or exceeded those of five male col-
leagues who received more favorable treatment.
The EEOC began an investigation and requested docu-
ments from the university related to its tenure decisions
on Tung and the five male faculty members identified in
Ring's complaint.
The university, stressing that the confidentiality of peer
review is an important component of the tenure process,
refused to produce any records that reflected either the
tenure committee's internal deliberations, or the opinions
of Professor lung's peers (from both inside and outside
the university) as to the quality of her scholarship or her
suitability for tenure. It also refused to produce these same
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types of documents for the five named male faculty.
The EEOC issued a subpoena for these materials and ad-
vised the university that it would initiate subpoena enforce-
ment proceedings in court if the documents were not
produced. The university refused to comply with the sub-
poena and the EEOC brought an enforcement action. The
district court enforced the subpoena and, on appeal to the
court of appeals, that decision was upheld. The Supreme
Court granted the university's request for a writ of
certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
When Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was passed in
1964, it prohibited discrimination in employment because
of race, sex, religion or national origin, but exempted from
regulation "educational institution[s] with respect to the
employment of individuals to perform work connected
with the educational activities of such institutions."
Congress eliminated that exemption in 1972 after hav-
ing determined that discrimination was as prevalent in the
academic workplace as it was in the industrial workplace.
Congress specifically found that statistics indicated that
women and minorities were being excluded from presti-
gious and high-paying academic positions.
Although the protection afforded by Title VII was ex-
tended to university professors, the courts have shown a
certain reluctance in enforcing this protection. As stated
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, "education and
faculty appointments are probably the least suited for fed-
eral court supervision." Faro a New York University, 502
FE2d 1229, 1231-1232 (1974). This reluctance stems from
the judiciary's recognition of the need for scholarly ex-
pertise in academic decision-making as well as its unwill-
ingness to infringe upon academic freedom.
Adding to the effects of this judicial reluctance is the pro-
cedural posture of Title VII, which places the burden on
the plaintiff-professor to prove that the adverse employ-
ment decision, such as denial of tenure or promotion, was
caused by racial or sexual discrimination and not based
on legitimate academic grounds.
Accordingly, the number of plaintiffs who have success-
fully challenged the academic employment decisions of
colleges and universities has been few indeed. The deci-
sion reached by the Supreme Court in this case will either
facilitate the process of proving discrimination or place ad-
ditional obstacles in the path of plaintiff-professors.
In arriving at a decision regarding tenure, most univer-
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sites rely heavily on a process known as peer review. Un-
like employment decisions in the industrial setting, which
are based on supervisors' evaluations of workers, employ-
ment decisions regarding professors are based on evalua-
tions submitted by the professor's peers, both from the
professor's home university as well as from outside the
university.
Peer reviews evaluate the depth and creativity of the
professor's current scholarly work and assess the profes-
sor's potential for future scholarly contributions. These
reviews often involve a comparison of the professor's work
with that of other scholars in the professor's academic
field. Many universities contend that, in order for the peer
review process to function effectively, the reviewers must
be assured of confidentiality.
On the one hand, if reviewers knew that their evalua-
tions would be publicly disseminated, they arguably would
refrain from the type of frank analysis that is critical to mak-
ing an informed tenure decision. On the other hand, be-
cause these peer reviews play such a central role in tenure
decisions, they may contain the only evidence of a univer-
sity's discriminatory motives. The reviews may also dis-
close whether a university applied different standards in
evaluating male and female candidates.
An example of how such reviews can be tainted by sex
discrimination was presented to the Supreme Court last
term in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989);
1988-89 Preview 69. In that case, an accountant was de-
nied partnership in her firm after the firm's partners sub-
mitted written comments noting that she was "macho,"
needed to take a course in charm school, should dress
more femininely and should wear make-up and jewelry.
Thus, if the Supreme Court denies the EEOC access to
such peer review documents, it may be difficult, if not im-
possible, to determine whether a university's decision was
based on impermissible sexual or racial discrimination. If
the Supreme Court grants the EEOC access, the candor
of such reviews may diminish, undermining their value in
the tenure process.
ARGUMENTS
For the University of Pennsylvania (Counsel of Rec-
ord, Rex E. Lee, Sidley & Austin, 1722 Eye St., .W,
Washington, DC 20006; telephone (202) 429-4000):
1. Peer review materials are entitled to protection under
the First Amendment. The First Amendment's guaran-
tee of free speech implicitly recognizes a right of aca-
demic freedom. One aspect of academic freedom is the
right to decide who will teach. Peer reviews are an es-
sential element in making a tenure decision, which is,
in essence, a decision about who will teach.
2. Peer review materials are entitled to protection under
a common-law qualified privilege. Some federal courts
have recognized a qualified privilege for confidential
academic documents as a means of protecting academic
freedom.
Society has an Interest in ensuring that universities
promote the robust exchange of ideas. Academic free-
dom is necessary for universities to fulfill that role. The
Supreme Court has recognized in similar situations that
a qualified privilege is essential to protect the public
interest in candid, objective and even harsh opinions
where necessary to protect presidential decision-
making (United States t. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)) or
judicial decision-making (Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1 (1933)). Several states have adopted a privilege
to protect confidential communications in analogous
contexts.
3. Requiring disclosure would infringe on a university's
First Amendment rights as well as disregard a univer-
sity's qualified privilege. Before requiring disclosure,
the Court should require the EEOC to justify its demand
for access.
4. The subpoena enforcement provisions of Title VII
should be narrowly construed to include a qualified
privilege for peer review materials. In the absence of
a clear congressional statement authorizing intrusions
by the EEOC on academic freedom, the Court should
narrowly construe the statute so as to prevent any in-
fringement on this First Amendment right.
5. A rule requiring disclosure upon a mere showing of rel-
evance is not narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest sufficient to justify an intrusion on a First
Amendment right. Rather, the EEOC should be required
to demonstrate a specific need for disclosure that out-
weighs a university's interest in confidentiality.
For the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (Kenneth IV Starr, Solicitor General, Department
of Justice, Washington, DC 20530; telephone (202)
633-2217):
1. The EEOC needs access to peer review materials in or-
der to determine whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that an educational institution has engaged in
illegal discrimination.
Congress expressly extended the prohibitions of Ti-
tle VII to academic institutions and authorized the
EEOC to enforce the prohibitions. Congress gave
specific consideration to the effect Title VII would have
on a university's tenure process and rejected all attempts
to preserve an exemption for universities. Congress in-
tended that academic employment decisions should be
subc..,ted to the same scrutiny and enforcement proce-
dures as industrial employment decisions.
In order to make the statutorily required reasonable
cause determination, the EEOC must review the same
materials that the university-employer relied on in mak-
ing its decision.
2. The language of Title VII forecloses any argument that
a qualified privilege should be read into the statute. The
statute explicitly gives the EEOC the right of access to
any relevant evidence. It also addresses the employer's
Issue No. 3 81
interest In confidentiality by making it unlawful for the
EEOC to disclose any information obtained in its in-
vestigation. Thus, the statute has already struck the bal-
ance between the EEOC's need for relevant evidence
and the employer's interest in confidentiality.
3. Granting access to peer review materials does not in-
fringe on a university's academic freedom. Disclosure
does not interfere with a university's right to decide on
academic grounds who will teach. The EEOC seeks ac-
cess to determine if the tenure decision was based on
impermissible racial or sexual grounds, which invidi-
ous discrimination has never been afforded affirmative
constitutional protection.
Neither has the University of Pennsylvania demon-
strated that confidentiality is essential to effective peer
review; its assertion is based on unsupported opinion,
not empirical evidence.
4. Assuming access to peer review materials infringes on
a university's academic freedom, there is a substantial
relationship between the EEOC's request to review the
documents and the compelling national interest in
eliminating invidious discrimination in employment at
academic institutions. Eliminatir employment dis-
crimination is a national goal of the highest priority;
this is particularly true of academic institutions, which
play a major role in shaping society's future.
Where peer review documents play a central role in
a university's employment decision, access to those
documents is essential to a determination of whether
the decision was impormissibly based on race or sex
discrimination.
5. Recognition of a qualified privilege would seriously im
pede enforcement of Title VII. A qualified privilege re-
quiring-a court to apply some type of balancing test
would generate endless opportunities for procedura
delays. Litigation over the application of a qualifiec
privilege would substantially slow the investigation ol
charges filed with the EEOC.
6. There is no common-law privilege protecting peer re
view materials.
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